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The present study deals with asymmetric price transmission (APT) along the fish value chain by
using a consistent threshold autoregressive (consistent TAR and momentum-threshold autoregressive
[M-TAR]) model. A nonzero threshold captures strategic behaviors and adjustment costs that are not
observable with small price changes around a zero threshold. Fish farming, because of greater control
over supply, is expected to produce less asymmetry than wild harvesting. Asymmetry is notwithstanding
found for both wild cod and farmed salmon marketed in France, but only with consistent thresholds
and operating in opposite ways. The results are discussed with regard to the trade restrictions imposed
by the Common Fisheries Policy.
Cet article traite de l’asyme´trie de transmission des prix (ATP) dans la filie`re des produits de la mer en
utilisant un mode`le autore´gressif a` effet de seuil (consistent TAR etM-TAR). Un seuil non nul permet
de re´ve´ler certains comportements strate´giques et des couˆts fixes d’ajustement qui ne seraient pas
observables sur de faibles variations de prix autour d’un seuil nul. On s’attend a` ce que l’aquaculture,
en vertu d’un degre´ de controˆle supe´rieur sur l’offre, engendre une plus faible asyme´trie comparativement
a` la production halieutique. Une asyme´trie de transmission est ne´anmoins observe´e a` la fois dans le
cas du cabillaud sauvage et du saumon d’e´levage commercialise´s en France, mais uniquement a` partir
de seuils endoge`nes et l’ATP agissant en sens oppose´. Les re´sultats sont commente´s au regard des
restrictions commerciales impose´s par la Politique Commune des Peˆches europe´enne.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of asymmetric price transmission (APT) has been analyzed by agricultural
economists for a very long time as it represents a case of market failure in microeconomic
theory. Any exogenous shock to the price system, either coming from the supply or the
demand side, should result in symmetric adjustments to the long-run market equilibrium,
whether the price shock is negative or positive. Various empirical or theoretical reasons
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are proposed to explain a differentiated adjustment of the consumer price according to
the sign of the ex-farm price change. In recent studies, it is admitted that an asymmetric
transmission would either stem from adjustment costs—such as menu costs—or from a
strategic behavior of the intermediaries. In particular, the big multiple retailers would be
more reluctant to transmit a price decrease of the primary product than a price increase to
the consumer. Such asymmetry might create distortion in the transmission of information
down the marketing chain, hence giving some evidence of market power. The final price
does not equal the market clearing price, and primary production could be temporarily
in excess.
The adjustment costs, although acknowledged as important barriers to perfect trans-
mission in the food value chains, are rarely measured as such in the literature. The thresh-
old andmomentum-threshold autoregressive (TARandM-TAR)models provide perhaps
the most reliable methodology to deal with this appraisal when using nonstationary time
series. However, these methods are mostly used with a zero threshold that may not be the
most appropriate value in the case ofmodern distribution practices. Our contribution uses
a more consistent threshold to look at food markets whose asymmetric patterns can only
be observed whenever the price change of the primary product exceeds a certain limit.
Below this limit, adjustment costs would not be covered by the benefits of a faster trans-
mission and retail prices are adjusted symmetrically as a routine. Beyond the threshold,
the adjustment behavior might be different because the margin is lastingly affected.
This paper looks at two different fish supply chains in France (farmed Atlantic
salmon [Salmo salar] and wild-harvested North Atlantic cod [Gadus morhua]) passing
through the single outlet of supermarket chains. The marketing behaviors are expected
to be different in the two chains because the control over production is greater in the case
of fish farming. Adjustment costs being higher for fish harvesting, they are assumed to
produce more asymmetric results than farmed products. The regulations adopted within
the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) framework affect both the supply of wild-
caught fish (total allowable catch [TAC] and quota) and farmed fish (minimum import
prices [MIPs] and other trade restrictions for the Norwegian farmed Atlantic salmon).
As a result, inelastic supply may increase the adjustment costs of the intermediaries and
produce APT down the chain.
The second section introduces a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical
background of APT. The third one gives some industrial features and data on the fishing
industry used in this study. The methodology and empirical results are developed in the
fourth and fifth sections, before the discussion in the last section.
THE ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC PRICE TRANSMISSION
Microeconomic theory predicts that any external shock to the demand or supply side of
a market, whatever the number of stages between producers and consumers, should not
result in a different speed (or length) of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium according
to the sign of the variation. Any significant difference would reveal a case ofmarket failure
as long as the output price is expected to respond symmetrically to variations of input
prices. In that respect, both elasticity of derived demand and consumer price elasticity
should be equal (Wohlgenant 2001). Various explanations of lead lag relations between
different levels of the chain are given in the literature (for a review of the APT literature,
see for instance Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004; Frey and Manera 2007). Heien
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(1980) and Worth (1999) note that repricing may be costly due to the time requested to
put on new labels (namely themenu costs), and to the loss of goodwill from the consumers
who prefer stable prices. Heien points out the importance of storage in price transmission
and Wohlgenant (1985) has also shown that inventory holding by retailers can explain
for a large part the delay in the price pass-through between wholesale and retail. There is
also a common feeling that market power is used by stakeholders to pass a cost increase
more rapidly on to the next stage whereas they will delay the transmission of a cost
decrease. This may result in market inefficiencies and suboptimal resource allocation.
Indeed, asymmetry in the vertical transmission of prices is generally considered as a
sign of collusive behavior (Carlton 1989; Azzam 1999). Such a suspicion stems from
the observation in the European food markets that the downstream industries are more
concentrated than the primary ones. Nevertheless, Eckert (2002) shows that asymmetry
can also be the consequence of a price war, with alternating phases of declines and sharp
increases, after which the price has reached such a low level that it is not worthwhile
for a firm to look for a larger market share by setting a lower price. Azzam (1999) also
considers that a competitive retail sector is not incompatible with asymmetry insofar as
spatially competitors face concave spatial demand functions. Bailey and Brorsen (1989)
have demonstrated that a kinked demand curve could lead to asymmetric responses.
Finally, Griffith and Piggott (1994), in their study of the Australian three-stage chain
for beef, lamb, and pork meat, indicate the presence of asymmetry in some of the tested
markets, but not in the pork market where there is a higher degree of concentration and
high cross-price elasticities with the lamb and beef markets where asymmetry was found.
On the basis of previous results, the link between asymmetric adjustment and market
power is far from being clearly demonstrated.
Other explanations can be found in the literature. For Kinnucan and Forker (1987),
public intervention on markets can be a source of asymmetry. In particular, floor price
policies on farm products, aimed at protecting producers’ income for a period, may
reduce the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of cost changes. An increase due
to the implementation of a floor price is more likely to be interpreted as permanent
and transmitted more rapidly by the middlemen than a decrease which is perceived as
a transitory change. Ward (1982) does not provide any reason for the asymmetry found
on a three-stage chain for fresh vegetables, but he notes that the perishable nature of
products may be a partial explanation because “rising prices could reduce retail sales
and increase the incidence of spoilage” (Ward 1982, p. 210). Retailers would then delay
the transmission of upstream price increases because they fear not to be able to sell
the full stock. The risk dimension has also been introduced in the analysis by Brorsen
et al (1985). Our contribution discusses the threshold above or below which APT may
appear. Implicitly, the literature refers to a zero threshold, from which positive and
negative shocks on the supply side are differentially transmitted to the demand side.
The present paper introduces consistent thresholds which may reveal APT although not
visible with a zero threshold. We assume that producers may face difficulties to adjust the
supply levels to the frequent and successive shifts of demand, in particular for those fresh
products for which inventories are not always possible. Uncertainty affecting the supply
conditions is the rule rather than the exception, making expectations and adjustments
more chaotic on the supply side. Such conditions are particularly present in the fishing
industry due to the environmental conditions surrounding the exploitation of wild-caught
and common-pool resources. The catch levels fluctuate to a great extent from one period
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Table 1. Supermarket sales of fresh fish in 1998
Whole fish Steaks and fillets Total
Cod
Qty 1,269 mt 8,448 mt 9,717 mt
Val 9,786 × 103 euro 76,733 × 103 euro 80,411 × 103 euro
Pr. 7.71 euro/kg 9.08 euro/kg 8.28 euro/kg
Salmon
Qty 6,752 mt 11,486 mt 18,238 mt
Val 35,706.103 euro 115,880.103 euro 163,432.103 euro
Pr. 5.29 euro/kg 10.09 euro/kg 8.96 euro/kg
Source: FranceAgrimer (http://www.franceagrimer.fr/).
Note: mt, metric tonnes.
to another, thus affecting the whole organization along the marketing chain. For the
last two decades, control over fish farming production has substantially contributed to
reduce the variability of the fish supply, and fits better with modern retailing facilities.
The farmed or wild-harvested origin of the products results in different elasticities of
supply because adjustment is easier when the fish can be slaughtered at chosen periods
of time. As a consequence, it seems interesting to investigate the relationship between the
characteristics of supply (farmed or wild-caught species) and the results regarding APT
at different stages. Fish farming is expected to reduce the asymmetry phenomenon as
compared to commercial fishing of wild species.
THE MARKETING CHAINS OF COD AND SALMON
The paper looks for possible APT of North Atlantic wild (whole fresh) cod (G. morhua)
and farmed (whole fresh) Atlantic salmon (S. salar) between the production and retailing
sectors. The study is conducted between 1988 and 1999 when cod landings were still
at meaningful levels compared to salmon imports and when products are homogenous
throughout time. The study was extended to a more recent period (1998–2009) but with
different results because products were too different along the period to allow for con-
sistent samples (see footnote 6 and Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). Indeed, the two
value chains have experienced important changes in the nature of the traded products
(both species are increasingly sold as fillets or in pieces, including new processing and
marketing costs within the chain1). During the last two decades, salmon has become a
major species on the French market. Structural changes have led to a new role for inter-
mediaries, shifting frommere commercial intermediation to sub-contracting (Guillotreau
et al 2005). The two species accounted for a 30% market share of total finfish in France
(Tables 1 and 2). Cod has been consumed in France for centuries, the country traditionally
being an important producing country until recently. However, as stocks of gadiforms2
1 In Figures 1 and 2, prices for the two value chains are plotted along the full sample on a monthly
basis (January 1988–April 2010) and show clearly the presence of structural breaks in the price
series due to changing product forms over time.
2 Group of species including the gadoid species (such as cod, haddock, etc.) and hake species. This
group is also defined as the category of whitefish species.
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Table 2. Market shares in 1998
Quantity Value
Whole fresh fish Cod 2.6% 3.1%
Salmon 19.6% 16.0%
Fresh steak and fillets Cod 15.0% 14.7%
Salmon 19.4% 21.0%
Total fresh products Cod 10.4% 11.3%
Salmon 19.5% 19.6%
Source: FranceAgrimer (http://www.franceagrimer.fr/).
became depleted in theNorthAtlantic, the domestic catches have decreased in proportion
to a very low level. Cod is usually considered as the most representative and the most
appreciated of the whitefish species with more than 100,000 mt consumed in 1998 under
different product forms (frozen, fresh, breaded, fillets, etc.).
Approximately half of the fresh cod consumed in France comes from domestic
landings, although the levels have sharply decreased since the early 1990s: stable around
50,000mt, they dropped down to some 17,500mt in 1998 and to only 4,800mt in 2007 due
to the reduction of the TAC and the national quota (share of the TAC). The product form
(fresh, frozen, whole, or fillets) determines the market channel and the type of outlets.
When the fish is domestically landed as whole fresh fish, the primary processors are the
first buyers through an auction system, and they sell the fish (whole or filleted) either
directly to the retailers and the restaurants, or to the middlemen on the wholesale markets
located in the biggest French towns (Paris-Rungis, Bordeaux, Nantes, Marseille, etc.).
Aswith other foodmarkets, theFrenchmarket for cod has registeredmajor structural
changes over the past 20 years, such as the growing importance of supermarkets, the
emerging consumption of processed food, and the globalization of supply, but it has been
fairly stable in comparison with salmon consumption. The market share of salmon (in
value) has sharply increased from less than 25% in 1976 to 40% in 1998, despite a constant
fall of salmon prices over the period and the increasing prices of whitefish species since
1995.
Atlantic salmon consumed in France is almost fully supplied by imports. In 1982,
the market represented a quantity of about 23,000 metric tonnes (t) and a value close to
1,500 millions of francs 1998 (230 million Euros). The North American producers (the
United States andCanada) ofwild-caught pacific salmon (Onchorynchus kisutch) supplied
the most with two-thirds the supply. Sixteen years later, consumption has increased five
fold to 112,000 mt (and even 150,000 mt in 2009) although the value has only been
twofold in real terms (2,600 millions of francs 1998; 400 million Euros). Atlantic salmon
(S. salar) makes the bulk of the French market and is imported from European countries,
in particular from Norway (57,400 mt in 1998, including trade flows passing through
Denmark) and Scotland (22,600 mt).
The most recent data (2010) show that more than 70% of fresh salmon and cod
are marketed by hyper- and supermarkets, far ahead of fishmongers, market stalls, and
other retailers. “A more stable supply of fresh products, likely due to improvements in
agricultural techniques and increased imports, contributes to a reduction in the variance
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of grower prices” (Worth 1999, p. 27). The increasing returns to scale and know-how of
the Norwegian producers and the development of imports are two major features of the
sector likely to fit with big multiple retailers because of the supply regularity and security
they provide.
However, imports were subject to trade regulations during the period covered by the
study. Beyond the customs tariff rates imposed under the CommonCustoms Tariff regime
(autonomous rates of 16–20%) and under the GATT/WTO (conventional rates of 2–
15%), safeguardmechanisms and antidumpingmeasures were implemented to protect the
European Union (EU) producers under the Common Organization of Markets (COM)
framework (Le Grel et al 2003). One of the safeguard mechanisms provided under the
COM is the provision for emergency measures. Under this provision, the commission
may take unspecified measures if imports cause union markets to experience, or to be
threatened with, “serious disturbances” which may endanger the objectives of the CFP.
This provision has been used by the EU since 1991 to impose a minimum price for farmed
Atlantic salmon imports from Norway.3
Empirical research is based on monthly prices for whole fresh fish between February
1988 and December 1999, using national sources for the data4: all series are in French
Francs per kg; Norwegian export prices were collected in Norwegian Kroners and con-
verted with the Datastream exchange rate series.
The price series and the sample period have been selected in order to represent two
short market channels, as far as possible without the intermediaries who may distort
transmission. Therefore the difference in prices could be interpreted as gross marketing
margins because there are low processing costs during that period of time, and transporta-
tion and labor costs are also fairly low. The main difference between the two marketing
chains lies in the supply-side organization. More than 90% of fresh cod domestically
produced is sold through auctions, unlike salmon purchased contractually for half of it
by the multiple grocers to the Norwegian exporters, the other half being bought on the
spot market (Guillotreau 2003). This split of the distribution of salmon reduces the spot
market share and in an aggregated price series, diminishes the apparent variance in the
price series.
THRESHOLD COINTEGRATION
Most of the studies dealing with APT of food markets use variants of an econometric
technique introduced by Wolffram (1971), refined by Houck (1977), and generalized by
Heien (1980) for estimating nonreversible functions. Another set of estimations based on
3 AnMIP was introduced by the EU for the first time in November 1991 to all imports of Atlantic
salmon. In 1994, this MIP only concerned the farmed Atlantic salmon. A floor price principle was
adopted in 1995. In addition to these measures, two regulations enforcing fixed antidumping and
countervailing duties were implemented in 1997. In 1999, last year of the period covered by the
study, the former fixed duties became variable (for more details about this issue, see Le Grel et al
2003).
4 Data sources: FranceAgrimer (http://www.franceagrimer.fr/) for the French landing price of
whole fresh cod, the supermarket price of whole fresh cod and salmon; Norwegian Trade Statistics
(http://www.ssb.no/fiskeri havbruk en/) for the Norwegian export price of whole fresh salmon.
Nominal prices were considered because the study includes price series only.
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error-correction models (hereafter, ECM) fits better with nonstationary price series (von
Cramon-Taubadel 1998). Finally, an innovative methodology has been introduced by
Abdulai (2002) when he examines short- and long-run farm-retail price spread by using
TAR and M-TAR models. Such cointegration models with asymmetric error correction
were first developed by Enders and Granger (1998) in order to improve the traditional
tests for unit roots and cointegration in the presence of asymmetric adjustment.
To obtain empirical evidence on the hypothesized difference between the two mar-
keting channels, we implement the threshold cointegration models proposed by Enders
and Siklos (2001) which is an extension of the two-step Engle and Granger (1987) pro-
cedure. Estimation proceeds as follows. The first step consists in estimating, via ordinary
least squares, the long-run equilibrium relationship between the log-linearized price at
the downstream level, denoted by lnP1t , and the log-linearized price at the upstream level,
denoted by lnP2
t
, for each fish species, that is
lnP1t =α +β lnP2t +μt (1)
where α and β denote parameters.
Equation (1) is identified with only prices at two different stages of the value chain,
assuming that other marketing factors affecting the retail price are held constant. It seems
to be a reasonable assumption to start with, in the case of fresh fish products. However,
in the most recent period (1999–2010) whose results are not presented in this study, other
inputs like the processing (filleting) costs should certainly be considered in the long-run
relationship.
In a second step, relying on the estimated residuals μEST t, the equation





t− j + εt (2)
is estimated using the indicator variable
Mt= 1, if μESTt−1 ≥ τ , and Mt= 0, if μESTt−1<τ (3a)
where τ is the value of the threshold. Equations (1), (2), and (3a) represent a TAR
model, where the indicator variable depends on the previous period value μEST t−1. The
adjustment is modeled by ρ1 μEST t−1, if μEST t−1 is above the threshold and by the term
ρ2 μ
EST
t−1, if μEST t−1 is below the threshold. Critical values for the t-statistics to test
the null hypotheses ρ1 = 0 and ρ2 = 0 and for the F-statistics, denoted by 	, to test
the null hypothesis ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 can be found in Enders and Siklos (2001) (Tables 1 and
2). The rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration, that is, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, will
indicate cointegration between the two price series. Moreover, if the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected, then the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment, that is, ρ1 =
ρ2, can be tested using the usual F-test.
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) suggest an alternative
specification that can capture the “sharp” asymmetric movement in the series of the
estimated residuals. In the introduction of thismodel, Enders andGranger (1998) describe
it as better at capturing data that are characterized by “increases that tend to persist and
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Table 3. Results of the ADF and DF-GLS unit root tests (January 1988–December 1999)
ADF test DF-GLS test
No constant, Constant, Constant Constant, Constant
Variable no trend no trend and trend no trend and trend
French retail price of 0.541 −2.282 −2.335 −0.591 −1.420
fresh cod (lags = 8) (lags = 4) (lags = 8) (lags = 8) (lags = 8)
French landing price 0.680 −1.691 −1.751 −1.600 −1.886
of fresh cod (lags = 13) (lags = 13) (lags = 13) (lags = 13) (lags = 13)
French retail price of −2.010∗∗ −2.424 −3.558∗∗ 0.886 −1.114
fresh salmon (lags = 12) (lags = 12) (lags = 12) (lags = 12) (lags = 12)
Price of fresh salmon −2.094∗∗ −2.281 −1.803 0.393 −1.432
imported from
Norway
(lags = 6) (lags = 6) (lags = 6) (lags = 6) (lags = 6)
Notes: Series are expressed in logarithm.
Statistical significance is indicated by a single asterisk (∗) for the 10% level and a double asterisk
(∗∗) for the 5% level.
decreases that tend to revert quickly to the attractor,” for example. Thus, they set the
indicator function as the following
Mt = 1, if μESTt−1 ≥ τ, and Mt= 0, if μESTt−1 < τ (3b)
Equations (1), (2), and (3b) represent anM-TARmodel where the indicator variable
depends now on the previous period change  μEST t−1. The adjustment is modeled
by ρ1 μEST t−1, if  μEST t−1 is above the threshold τ , and by the term ρ2 μEST t−1, if
 μEST t−1 is below the threshold τ . The null hypothesis of no cointegration, that is, ρ1 =
ρ2 = 0, can then be tested using the F-statistics, also denoted by 	, whose critical values
have been tabulated by Enders and Siklos (2001). Moreover, if the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected, then the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment, that is, ρ1 =
ρ2, can be tested using the usual F-test.
The first point to note is that the two previous models assume that the value of the
threshold parameter τ is known. Thus, they reduce to the models studied by Enders and
Granger (1998) when τ = 0. To estimate consistently this threshold parameter, we use
Chan’s method (1993). This method involves sorting the estimated residuals μtEST t in
ascending order, excluding the 15% largest and smallest values and selecting from the
remaining 70% values the threshold which yields the lowest residual sum of squares when
estimating an equation in the form of Equation (2) with an indicator function defined by
Equation (3a). For an M-TARmodel (the indicator function is now defined by Equation
[3b]), the method involves now sorting the estimated change μtEST t in ascending order,
and so on. Chan (1993) showed that searching over the potential threshold values so
as to minimize the residual sum of squares yields a (super)consistent estimate of the
threshold in that it converges in distribution with a speed of convergence proportional to
the sample size T. Moreover, asymptotic inference about the TAR parameters ρ1 and ρ2
can proceed as if the threshold value was known. Given this estimated threshold value,
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Source: FranceAgrimer (http://www.franceagrimer.fr/).
Figure 1. Landing and supermarket fresh cod prices in France (series are in logarithm of French
Francs per kilogram; 1€ = 6.55957 FF)
cointegration and symmetry tests can then be implemented using the tests presented
above.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Unit root tests, standard cointegration tests, and asymmetric TAR and M-TAR models
which are consistent (τ = 0) or not (τ = 0), are implemented for the logarithm of the
retail price and the logarithm of the shipping price of cod and salmon. In France, retail
and ex-vessel prices of whole fresh salmon and whole fresh cod have been collected from
the National office of agricultural and seafood products (France Agrimer), respectively,
through a large panel of consumers (Kantar Worldpanel) and from a comprehensive
set of 40 auction markets of fishery products (Re´seau Inter-Crie´es-RIC). Salmon export
prices were collected from the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics on the basis of national
customs (unit values of whole fresh salmon). Regarding possible errors in variables, one
could consider measurement errors in the retail prices due to the sampling procedure
adopted but not in the independent variables coming from comprehensive surveys. Their
time paths are reported in Figures 1 and 2.
Stochastic Properties of the Series
First, we investigate the stochastic properties of the four price series individually im-
plementing the test approaches proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). The lag
length p of the ADF regression is determined using the Hall’s (1994) general-to-specific
procedure where the upper bound pmax is given by Schwert’s (1989) formula: pmax =
integer part of 12 (T/100)1/4. Results of the ADF tests are reported in Table 2. These tests
clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected when considering
the French retail price of fresh cod, the French landing price of the fresh cod, and the price
of fresh salmon imported from Norway. The results are less clear-cut when considering
the French retail price of fresh salmon. But it is well known that in testing for unit root
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Sources: FranceAgrimer (http://www.franceagrimer.fr/); Norwegian Trade Statistics
(http://www.ssb.no/fiskeri havbruk en/).
Figure 2. Import and supermarket prices of fresh salmon in France (series are in logarithm of
French Francs per kilogram; 1€ = 6.55957 FF)
nonstationarity, the power of the ADF test is questionable. To minimize this problem, a
modified Dickey-Fuller test with good properties is also applied, in addition to the usual
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
In order to improve the power of the unit root test, Elliott et al (1996) proposed a
local to unity de-trending of the time series. They then developed feasible point-optimal
tests that take serial correlation of the error term into account. In particular, they suggest
the Dickey-Fuller GLS (hereafter, DF-GLS) which is a modified ADF test applied to the
de-trended data without the intercept. Let Pt be the considered price series. The DF-GLS
t-test is performed by testing the null hypothesis θ 0 = 0 in the regression.
Pdt = θ0Pdt−1 +
∑
j=1,...,p
θ jPdt− j + εt
where εt is the random error term, and Pdt is the locally de-trended price series. The local
de-trending depends on whether we consider amodel with drift only or a linear trend, that
is, the local de-trended price series is defined as Pd t = Pt – βZt, with Zt = 1 in the first
case, andZt = (1, t) in the second case. The parameters β are obtained by regressing Ptrans
onZtrans wherePtrans = (P1,P2 – λP1, . . .,PT – λPT−1)’,Ztrans = (Z1,Z2 – λZ1, . . .,ZT –
λZT−1)’. The scalar λ is set to λ = 1+ c/T where c denotes a constant. Depending on the
deterministic component in Zt, c is set either to −7 in the case of a constant or to −13.5
in the case of a linear trend. These values have been derived from the asymptotic power
functions and its envelope. Critical values for the DF-GLS test are provided in Elliott
et al (1996).
The results of the DF-GLS tests are also reported in Table 3. The lag length for each
test is chosen using Hall’s (1994) general-to-specific procedure. The results clearly show
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected whatever the considered price
series.
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Cointegration and Asymmetric Estimations
Following the cointegration analysis in the Engle and Granger (1987) sense, the long-run
equilibrium relationships between upstream prices and downstream prices are estimated
by ordinary least squares. The estimated long-run equilibrium relationships are:
Codfish:
lnP1t= 2.847+ 0.398 lnP2t + μESTt (4a)
Salmon5:
lnP1t= 1.912+ 0.535 lnP2t + μESTt (4b)
where lnP1 t denotes the log-linearized price at the downstream level and lnP2 t, the log-
linearized price at the upstream level. Thus, the parameters of lnP2 t can be interpreted as
the long-run elasticities of the price P1 with respect to the price P2. They give in fact the
magnitude of adjustment of the retail price to the variations of the shipping price. Their
estimated values indicate that shifts in the shipping price are not fully passed onto retail
price. Moreover, the magnitude is higher for salmon than for codfish.
Next, following the Engle-Granger methodology, the residuals of each equation are
used to estimate





t− j + εt (5)
Akaike and Schwarz information criterions (AIC and SIC, respectively) are used in
order to choose the number of lags p in this equation. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the
model using no lagged change seems to be appropriate in the case of codfish while a
model using one-lagged change seems to be more appropriate in the case of salmon. As
reported in the second column of these tables, the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that
ρ1 = 0 are quite large. At the conventional significance levels, the Engle-Granger test
clearly indicates that the two price series are cointegrated whatever the considered fish
species.
Next, we estimated the residuals of each Equation (4a) or (4b) in the form of a TAR
model or an M-TAR model using the threshold τ = 0. The third and fourth columns
of Tables 4 and 5 report the corresponding results. The point estimates for ρ1 and ρ2
clearly indicate convergence. Indeed, these values are all negative and satisfy (1 + ρ1)
(1+ ρ2)< 1. All the associated t-statistics are less than the 1% critical value for the t-max
statistics, that is, approximately −2.57. Moreover, all the sample values of the	-statistics
5 Tested on a more recent sample period (January 1998 to April 2009), the long-run equi-
librium relationship was the following one for fresh salmon (it was not possible to find
any consistent relationship for cod prices): lnP1t= 2.985+ 0.377 lnP2t + μESTt (4c) [t-stat
are 12.058 and 4.702, respectively]. But evidence of a cointegration relationship is weak, and the
APT tests on TAR and M-TAR models gave odd results (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix),
presumably because of this lack of long-run relationship.
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Table 4. Estimates of price transmission in the codfish value chain (January 1988−December 1999)
Engle- Threshold- Momentum-
Granger Threshold Momentum consistent consistent
ρ 1 −0.630 −0.500 −0.551 −0.456 −0.512
(−8.161)1 (−4.255) (−6.943) (−4.183) (−5.301)
ρ 2 NA −0.727 −0.730 −0.796 −0.882
(−7.153)2 (−4.750) (−7.481) (−6.984)
τ NA 0 0 −0.112 −0.107
AIC3 −1.364 −1.365 −1.367 −1.385 −1.396
SIC3 −1.323 −1.325 −1.325 −1.343 −1.354
	4,5 NA 34.637 35.380 36.729 38.441
ρ 1 = ρ 26 NA 2.135 1.302 4.977 5.397
(0.146) (0.256) (0.027) (0.022)
Notes: 1Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 1 = 0.
2Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 2 = 0.
3AIC and SIC denote the Akaike and the Schwarz criterions. The AIC and SIC are computed as:
−2L/T + 2K/T , and −2L/T + K log(T)/T , respectively, where L denotes the likelihood and K
is the number of regressors in the estimated model.
4Entries in this row and in the third and fourth columns are the sample values of the TAR and
M-TAR 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR 	 for a two variable case and no lagged change are
approximatively 5.01, 5.98, and 8.24 for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The corresponding values
for M-TAR 	 are approximatively 5.45, 6.51, and 8.78. See table 1 in Enders and Siklos (2001).
5Entries in this row and in the fifth and sixth columns are the sample values of the TAR-consistent
and M-TAR-consistent 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR-consistent 	 for a two variable case
and no lagged change are approximately 5.95, 6.95, and 9.27 for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The corresponding values for M-TAR 	 are approximately 5.73, 6.78, and 9.14. See table 5 in
Enders and Siklos (2001).
6Entries in this row are the sample F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the adjustment
coefficients are equal. Significance levels are in parentheses below.
largely exceed the 1% critical value (approximately 8.30). The null hypothesis ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
can therefore be rejected, confirming that the price series are co-integrated regardless of
the fish species considered. Given the price series are co-integrated, the null hypothesis of
symmetric adjustment (i.e., ρ1 = ρ2) can be tested using a standard F-distribution (Enders
andGranger 1998). All the sample F-statistics values and their associated p-values clearly
indicate that this null hypothesis cannot be rejected at usual levels of significance whatever
the considered TAR or M-TAR model or fish species. Thus using the standard Enders
and Granger’s (1998) methodology, that is, assuming that τ = 0, price transmission seems
to be symmetric in the two value chains.
Next we use Chan’s (1993) method to find the consistent estimates of the thresholds.
Whenwe searched over the possible thresholds lying in themiddle 70%of the sorted values
of {μEST t} in the case of the codfish species, we found that a threshold of −0.112 results
in the smallest residual sum of squares. The results of the estimation of the corresponding
TAR model are reported in the fifth column of Table 4. When we performed the same
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Table 5. Estimates of price transmission in the salmon value chain (January 1988–December 1999)
Engle- Threshold- Momentum-
Granger Threshold Momentum consistent consistent
ρ 1 −0.739 −0.759 −0.718 −0.868 −0.651
(−7.860)1 (−6.096) (−5.989) (−7.975) (−5.999)
ρ 2 NA −0.719 −0.762 −0.488 −0.908
(−5.953)2 (−6.062) (−3.388) (−6.416)
γ 1 0.175 0.176 0.175 0.195 0.191
(2.101)3 (2.097) (2.096) (2.356) (2.283)
τ NA 0 0 −0.099 −0.035
AIC4 −2.447 −2.434 −2.432 −2.470 −2.452
SIC4 −2.406 −2.371 −2.371 −2.407 −2.389
	5,6 NA 30.716 30.723 34.367 32.509
ρ 1 = ρ 27 NA 0.066 0.077 5.122 2.550
(0.798) (0.783) (0.025) (0.112)
Notes: 1Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 1 = 0.
2Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 2 = 0.
3Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis γ 1 = 0.
4AIC and SIC denote the Akaike and the Schwarz criterions. The AIC and SIC are computed as:
−2L/T + 2K/T , and −2L/T + K log(T)/T , respectively, where L denotes the likelihood and
K the number of regressors in the estimated model.
5Entries in this row and in the third and fourth columns are the sample values of the TAR and
M-TAR 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR 	 for a two variable case and one lagged change
are approximatively 4.99, 6.01, and 8.30 for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The corresponding
values for M-TAR 	 are approximatively 5.47, 6.51, and 8.65. See table 1 in Enders and Siklos
(2001).
6Entries in this row and in the fifth and sixth columns are the sample values of the TAR-consistent
and M-TAR-consistent 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR-consistent 	 for a two variable case
and one lagged change are approximatively 6.02, 7.08, and 9.51 for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The corresponding values for M-TAR-consistent 	 are approximatively 5.76, 6.86, and 9.29. See
table 6 in Enders and Siklos (2001).
7Entries in this row are the sample F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the adjustment coefficient
is equal. Significance levels are in parentheses below.
search using the M-TAR model so that the potential thresholds are now the middle
70% of the sorted values of { μEST t}, we found a threshold of −0.107 (see the sixth
column of Table 4). In the case of the salmon species, the consistent estimates of the
thresholds we obtained using similar search procedures, are −0.099 and −0.035 for the
TAR and M-TAR models. The first point to note is that all the point estimates of ρ1
and ρ2 are significantly different of zero, and that all the 	-statistics clearly indicate the
rejection of the null hypothesis ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 at the usual levels of significance, whatever
the considered model and fish species. The upstream and downstream price series are
thus co-integrated, whatever the considered fish species. The second point to note is that
the F-test for symmetric adjustment can be rejected at the 5% level when considering the
codfish species, whatever the considered model, while it can be rejected at the same level
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only when considering the TAR-consistent model in the case of the salmon species. These
findings suggest that the adjustment is asymmetric in the two value chains.
Both the TAR-consistent and the M-TAR-consistent models suggest asymmetric
adjustment for the series in the codfish case while only the TAR-consistent model in
the salmon case. Thus, it would be interesting to ascertain whether adjustment follows a
TAR or an M-TAR process. For such a test, Enders and Granger (1998) suggest using
the values of the usual information criterions, AIC and BIC, to select the model with the
best overall fit. As is evident in fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 (respectively, Table
5), the M-TAR-consistent model (respectively, TAR-consistent model) yields the lowest
AIC and SIC and is therefore preferable for explaining asymmetric adjustment in the cod
(respectively, salmon) value chain.
To sum up, the estimates suggest asymmetric adjustment in the two value chains
but the way this asymmetric adjustment occurs differs between the two value chains.
In the codfish value chain, the adjustment process can be represented by the following
M-TAR-consistent model
μEST t = −0.512MtμESTt−1 − 0.882(1− Mt)μESTt−1 + εt (6a)
whereMt = 1 when μEST t−1 ≥ −0.107 andMt = 0 when μEST t−1 < −0.107, while in
the salmon value chain, the adjustment process can be represented by a TAR-consistent
model of the form
μESTt = −0.868MtμESTt−1 − 0.488(1−Mt)μESTt−1 + 0.195μESTt + εt (6b)
whereMt = 1 when μEST t−1 ≥ −0.099 andMt = 0 when μEST t−1 < −0.099.
Short-Run Dynamics
The finding of co-integration with asymmetric adjustment given byM-TARmodel in the
case of the codfish value chain or a TAR model in the case of the salmon value chain
represents the short-run dynamics of the log-linearized price at the downstream level as
an ECM like
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when considering the salmon value chain.
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As emphasized by von Cramon-Taubadel (1998), a valid statistical analysis of the
dynamics of the downstream price series requires lnP2 t to be weakly exogenous with
respect of the parameter of interest Equation (7). Testing the weak exogeneity of this
variable can be carried out by examining whether the ECT+ t−1 and ECT− t−1 are not
statistically significant when considering the marginal model (Boswijk and Urbain 1997)










t− j + εt (8)
Estimates of the conditional ECM (Equation [7]) and of the marginal ECM (Equa-
tion [8]) for each value chain are reported in Table 6 (the SIC is used to determine the
lag-length). Before proceeding with the weak exogeneity tests, it is imperative to check
each estimated ECM for possible misspecification. Results from various diagnostic tests
(Ljung-Box Q-statistics with four lags, ARCH-LM test, and Breusch-Godfrey serial cor-
relation test) confirm the absence of any serious misspecification in the estimated ECM.
We turn now to the results of the weak exogeneity test. The F-statistic for the null hypoth-
esis ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 0 is 1.732 when considering the price series in the codfish value chain, and
1.274 when considering the salmon value chain. Their respective empirical significance
level, that is, 18.09% and 28.31%, do not allow rejecting the considered null hypothesis.
Upstream prices are weakly exogenous whatever the value chain.
The estimates of the asymmetric ECMs presented in Table 6 are now used to develop
impulse response functions to further examine the dynamic interrelationships among the
upstream and downstream prices in the two value chains. Figures 3a and b illustrates re-
sponses of the log-run equilibrium margin to 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% positive or negative
variations in the logarithm of the upstream price for the two value chains. As expected,
responses to small upstream price variations are symmetric. Asymmetries occur when
considering large price variations. While the margin returns to its long-run equilibrium
value within the same period whatever the variation being positive or negative, the re-
sponses are contrasted. Thus, the downstream price adjusts more quickly to an increase
in the upstream price when considering the codfish value chain while the opposite result
is observed with the salmon value chain.
DISCUSSION
For both fish species (cod and salmon) price series at two different stages of the marketing
chain were found co-integrated during the period 1988–99. Price causation proved to be
unidirectional in all cases, going downward from the ex-vessel or ex-farm price to the
retail price (ECM testing the hypothesis of weak exogeneity). Consequently, production
prices and retail prices are moving altogether in the long run, retailers adjusting their
prices to the price changes upstream.
As far as APT tests were concerned, price transmission was found symmetrical for
both species in a first step (with a zero threshold), but a threshold different from zero
rejected the symmetry test for the two species.
The identification of a nonzero threshold is justified since no empirical or theoretical
background supports a priori the use of a zero threshold in the analysis of APT. Indeed,
one could admit that a price adjustment down the chain is triggered by either a contractual
agreement between the supplier and the buyer, or by an excessive contraction of the
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Table 6. Estimates of the error correction models (January 1988–December 1999)
Codfish Salmon
 P1 t  P2 t  P1 t  P2 t
ECT+ t−1 −0.326 0.199 −0.843 0.116
(−2.861) (1.711) (−8.280) (1.435)
ECT− t−1 −0.753 −0.059 −0.469 0.068
(−5.171) (−0.412) (−2.908) (1.118)
P1 t−1 −0.155 0.065 0.181 −0.030
(−1.293) (0.685) (2.520) (−0.432)
P1 t−2 −0.113 0.111 NA NA
(−1.115) (1.369)
P2 t 0.178 NA 0.292 NA
(2.466) (2.300)
P2 t−1 0.027 −0.345 −0.091 0.281
(0.296) (−4.363) (−0.847) (2.456)
P2 t−2 −0.031 −0.408 NA NA
(−0.479) (−5.572)
R2 0.364 0.255 0.359 0.072
DW 1.948 2.053 2.023 1.896
Ljung-Box Q-statistics with four lags 3.117 0.653 3.960 4.510
(0.538) (0.957) (0.411) (0.291)
ARCH-LM test 1.010 0.356 0.286 4.510
(0.315) (0.550) (0.594) (0.035)
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test 0.695 0.893 1.377 3.557
(0.706) (0.640) (0.502) (0.169)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses under the estimated values of the coefficients are White’s
heteroskedastic-consistent t-values.
Numbers in parentheses under the test statistics are their empirical significance level.
marketing margin beyond a certain level. As long as long term contracts which include
pricing conditions are poorly represented in the salmon international trade (Guillotreau
2003, p. 189), the second explanation is preferred. The negative threshold means that a
new behavior takes place after a substantial reduction of the margin. A positive threshold
would be presumablymore questionable and difficult to interpret, since there is no obvious
incentive for the retailer to give up higher temporary unit margins. The negative threshold
can be interpreted as follows: below a certain reduction of margin, variations of the
upstream price are symmetrically transmitted by the retailer to the consumer as a routine,
considering this reduction as bearable or temporary. Beyond this value, the reduction of
the margin represents a threat to the profitability of the intermediaries who then adopt a
different strategy.
Our empirical results give a strong support to this conclusion since the threshold
(around −10%) is similar for both products marketed through the same channel of
supermarkets, as though the latter would follow the same pricing strategy whatever the
fish species. Indeed the threshold is unique and negative and can be interpreted as follows:
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Table 7. Summary of the asymmetry results (January 1988–December 1999)
Species Model ρ 1 ρ 2
Cod (wild) M-TAR consistent −0.512 −0.882
(threshold = −0.107)
Salmon (farmed) TAR consistent −0.868 −0.488
(threshold = −0.099)
whenever the margin increases or decreases by less than 10%, the upstream price variation
is transmitted on a symmetric basis. Whenever the margin decreases by more than 10 %,
asymmetry occurs.
Interestingly, the asymmetry goes in opposite ways for farmed salmon on the one
hand and the wild-harvested cod on the other: price decreases upstream are more rapidly
transmitted at the retail stage in the former case, whereas increases of the ex-vessel price
are more quickly passed onto the consumer for the wild species (Table 7).
In addition to this statement, the TAR model had a better fit for farmed salmon
and M-TAR for the wild-caught species. M-TAR fit better with a steep asymmetric
adjustment, when increases tend to persist and decreases tend to revert quickly to the
long-run relation (Enders and Granger 1998). The result obtained for cod is consistent
with those found in another study (Jaffry 2004), where asymmetry has been reported with
an M-TAR model for fresh hake produced and consumed in France. For this case too,
asymmetry was operating in the same direction as wild cod, increases being passed on
more rapidly than decreases to the consumer (with, respectively, ρ1 = −0.239 and ρ2 =
−0.352), but with a threshold τ = 0 in that case.
The difference between the farmed or wild origin of the products leads to an expla-
nation in terms of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is far more important for fishing than
for aquaculture, whose control over production is higher (Anderson 2002). A decrease
is more likely to be perceived as permanent in the farming sector and will be therefore
transmitted to the consumer more rapidly than an increase which can be easily dealt with
by an adjustment of supply. For the retailers, the decrease of the unit margin will be offset
by an increase of sales.
Symmetrically, wild fish landings are subject to natural conditions and can be so
chaotic (particularly groundfish species like North Atlantic cod—G. morhua—whose
stock is severely depleted) that a decrease is seen as a transitory change in a structural
context of excess demand or shortage of supply. Supermarkets are reluctant to pass on
to consumers instantaneously a decrease of the upstream price because the whole supply
chain may not be able to meet the requirements of the additional level of consumption. In
this case, the retailers prefer to reduce the quantity on themarket, sending a negative signal
to the consumer. Indeed, the search costs must be considered as important adjustment
costs in the fishing industry and motivate asymmetry in the price-through (Peltzman
2000).
This result has important implications for the CFP because conservation of natural
stocks and market measures affect both supplies of wild-caught and farmed species. The
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production of wild species is bounded by the implementation of TAC defined yearly, or by
the constraints of fishing capacity following some effort limitationmeasures or vessel limit
decommissioning schemes.Within the CFP framework, fish prices may also be influenced
by the COM defining floor prices below which the fish is withdrawn from the market or
cannot be imported (see footnote 4 for salmon trade regulations on MIPs). EU imports
of farmed Atlantic salmon from Norway were affected by the external trade policy of the
EU during the 1990s and even after (MIPs, tariff duties). The EU represents one of the
major markets for Norwegian exports competing with the domestic industry in Scotland
or Ireland. Considering alleged dumping practices from the Norwegian industry, the
European Council imposed an MIP to Norway at different periods of time between 1991
and 1999, period of the study. More recently, the European Council fixed a minimum
price of 2.80 €/kg between January 2006 and July 2008 (Council Regulation (CE) No
685/2008 of 17 July 2008), as a substitute for previous customs tariffs ranging between
6.8% and 24.8%. Such a policy had important consequences on the input price by creating
market power on the supply side (Asche and Steen 2006). Any rigidity in the supply chain
increases the adjustment costs for the intermediaries along the chain. Any release of such
trade restrictions could very well be used by importers to expand their sales on the market
by adjusting quantities, thus increasingmarket shares by passing the price decrease rapidly
on to consumers.
We showed that the reduction ofmargins beyond a consistent threshold (e.g., because
of high input prices) may trigger asymmetry in the transmission of price changes. The
different EU policy measures and supply conditions influencing the trade of fishery
products (mainly quotas and environmental conditions) and farmed products (mainly
MIPs and trade restrictions) result in two opposite responses from the retailing industry
regarding asymmetry. Because of the inelastic supply of fishery products, retailers are
more likely to restore their margins by passing on input price increases more rapidly
than decreases. Concerning farmed salmon whose supply is not limited, margins have a
better chance to be recovered by a faster transmission of input price decreases whenever
trade regulations allow it, thus increasing their sales, rather than a higher retail price that
would reduce this highly elastic consumption (Asche et al 2002). Salmon is considered by
supermarkets as a cheap product attracting seafood consumers. The regularity of supply
in terms of quality, quantity, and price makes international trade of farmed salmon easier
than that of fishery products. In the long run, the multiple retailers would adjust to a
reduction of their gross margins through the quantity of farmed fish, and through prices
regarding the wild-harvested species.
As far as the APT methodology is concerned, the extension of the TAR and M-
TAR models to consistent thresholds appears to be of great interest because there is no
empirical or theoretical justification for looking for APT around a zero threshold. Indeed,
the behavior of intermediaries may change according to the level of marketing margins.
If the reduction of the margin is bearable in the short run, no particular asymmetric
adjustment is required. Conversely, a too large reduction of the margin may appeal for
different strategies.
The search costs, as long as they are measured around a consistent threshold, should
then be considered as important adjustment costs to explain the asymmetric adjustment
of prices along the food chain. The introduction of rigidity at the upstream level through
various policy and regulations may affect the asymmetric behavior down the chain as
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long as no adjustment through quantity is made possible. The use of thresholds different
from zero appears of great interest to analyze price transmission along the food supply
chains in order to both evaluate the strategic behavior of intermediaries and appreciate
the effects of policy measures on price transmission. Further analysis would be needed to
see whether the same value of the threshold is observed for other food value chains and
to possibly link this value to a strategic marketing behavior of multiple retailers.
In this paper, we showed that APT could be detected in market chains for two species
of fish in the Frenchmarket over a specific time period when product forms were relatively
homogeneous. Analyses for subsequent years in the salmon supply chain were however
not as conclusive.We attribute this inconclusiveness to the lack of equilibrium relationship
between the price series due to the change of product forms (more fillets and less whole
fish). The results of these subsequent analyses are shown in TableA2 (Appendix). Another
fruitful area of analysis would therefore be an exploration of techniques that permit the
detection of APT in the presence of structural changes.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Results of the ADF and DF-GLS unit root tests for salmon (January 1998–April 2009)
ADF test DF-GLS
No constant, Constant Constant, Constant, Constant,
Variable no trend trend and trend no trend and trend




(lags = 5) (lags = 5) (lags = 5) (lags = 5) (lags = 5)
French retail price 0.787 −1.316 −2.518 0.439 −2.493
of fresh salmon (lags = 16) (lags = 16) (lags = 14) (lags = 16) (lags = 14)
Notes: 1Series are expressed in logarithm.
2Statistical significance is indicated by a single asterisk (∗) for the 10% level and a double asterisk
(∗∗) for the 5% level.
Table A2. Estimates of price transmission in the salmon value chain (January 1998−April 2009)
Engle-Granger TAR M-TAR Threshold-TAR Threshold-M-TAR
ρ 1 −0.105 −0.019 0.020 0.033 0.217
(−1.786)1 (−0.247) (0.236) (0.363) (1.907)
ρ 2 NA −0.199 −0.201 −0.182 −0.181
(−2.501)2 (−2.726) (−2.602) (−2.958)
Lags 5 5 5 5 5
τ NA 0 0 0.116 0.062
AIC3 −2.471 −2.481 −2.492 −2.488 −2.540
(Continued)
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Table A2. Continued
Engle-Granger TAR M-TAR Threshold-TAR Threshold-M-TAR
SIC3 −2.340 −2.326 −2.338 −2.333 −2.385
	4,5 NA 3.128 3.865 3.590 7.052
ρ 1 = ρ 26 NA 3.015 4.451 3.917 10.666
Notes: 1Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 1 = 0. Note that ρ 1 = ρ 2 = ρ
when following the Engle-Granger methodology (second column).
2Entries in this row are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis ρ 2 = 0.
3AIC and SIC denote the Akaike and the Schwarz criterions. The AIC and SIC are computed as:
−2 L/T + 2 K/T , and −2 L/T + K log(T)/T , respectively, where L denotes the likelihood and K
is the number of regressors in the estimated model.
4Entries in this row and in the third and fourth columns are the sample values of the TAR and
M-TAR 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR 	 for a two variable case and one lagged change are
approximately 4.99, 6.01, and 8.30 for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The corresponding values
for M-TAR 	 are approximately 5.47, 6.51, and 8.65. See table 1 in Enders and Siklos (2001).
5Entries in this row and in the fifth and sixth columns are the sample values of the TAR-consistent
and M-TAR-consistent 	-statistics. Critical values for TAR-consistent 	 for a two variable case
and one lagged change are approximately 6.02, 7.08, and 9.51 for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The corresponding values for M-TAR-consistent 	 are approximately 5.76, 6.86, and 9.29. See
table 6 in Enders and Siklos (2001).
6Entries in this row are the sample F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the adjustment coefficient
is equal. Significance levels are in parentheses below.
